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Powell: Title VII

COMMENT

THE CLAIMS OF WOMEN OF COLOR UNDER
TITLE VII: THE INTERACTION OF
RACE AND GENDER
African-American women by virtue of our race
and gender are situated within at least two
systems of subordination: racism and sexism.
This dual vulnerability does not simply mean
that our burdens are doubled but instead, that
the dynamics of racism and sexism intersect our
lives to create experiences unique to US. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Ace was created to protect individuals from discriminatory employment practices
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 3 Federal
courts have applied differing standards when a woman of color
brings a claim which alleges an interaction of two or more of
these characteristics. 4 Since the statute can be read to set out
these characteristics as if each were mutually exclusive,5 the
1.
Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1467, 1468 (1992).
2.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1993) et. seq.; 110 CONGo REC. 7213 (1964).
3.
Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n., 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th
Cir. 1980).
4.
DeGraffenreid V. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo.
1976). But cr, Jefferies, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032; Judge V. Marsh, 649 F. Supp 770,
772 (D.D.C. 1986).
This was the original reading of the statute in DeGraffenreid. 413 F.
5.
Supp. at 143. In Jefferies V. Harris Community Action Ass'n., the Fifth circuit rejected this reading stating that House of Representatives had declined to amend
that statute to include the word "solely," showing the intent to prohibit discrimination based on any or all of the listed characteristics. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032.
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courts have initially denied any claim of discrimination based
on a combination of protected characteristics. s
When a woman of color claims she has experienced discrimination solely because she is a woman of color, she may be
faced with unique problems. 7 For example, an Asian woman
may allege discrimination based on being an "Asian woman".
Federal courts, viewing gender and race as individual characteristics,S would separate the claim into discrimination based
on race (Asian) and a separate claim based on gender (woman),
rather than viewing the claim as a single entity.9 The woman
would have Asian men included in her statistics demonstrating
race discrimination, and White women included in her statistics showing gender discrimination. 10
This would not occur if a White man claimed he was discriminated against as a ''White man."ll His claim would not
be separated into White and male, with Black men included in
the statistics for gender discrimination and White woman
included in the claim of race discrimination. 12 The White man
should not have his claims separated since he is suing as a
"White man," just as the Asian woman should not have her
claims separated. While her claims may be bifurcated by the
courts,13 the White male's would not. 14
Separation of the claims of women of color along race and
gender lines has occurred throughout history,I5 including

6.
In DeGraffenreid, for example, the court did not allow the plaintiff to
claim discrimination based on both gender and race. 413 F. Supp. at 145. In contrast, Jefferies u. Harris Community Ass'n, 411 U.S. 792, allowed the plaintiff to
bring an action based on race, gender and the interaction of the two claims.
7.
See, Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalzing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of AntiDiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, U. OF CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139 (1989).
8.
See, e.g., DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145.
9.
Id.
10.
Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (1994). In Lam, the
court discussed how the lower court incorrectly split a claim into "Asian" and
"woman."
11.
Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991)
12.
Id.
13.
DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145.
14.
Wilson, 934 F.2d 301.
BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WoMAN?, 160-162 (981), PAULA GIDDINGS,
15.
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within social movements such as women's suffrage and emancipation, where the focus was on the single characteristic of
either sex or race. 16 For example, in 1851 when Sojourner
Truth rose to give her famous speech "Ain't I a Woman?,,17 at
the Women's Rights conference in Akron, Ohio, several White
women tried to keep her silent. 1s The fear among the White
women was that if a Black woman was permitted to speak she
would change the focus from suffrage to emancipation. 19
This single characteristic analysis is also used when analyzing employment discrimination claims for race discrimination and sex discrimination. 20 A dominant view is that sex
discrimination focuses on White women and that race discrimination focuses on Black men, thus marginalizing the claims of
women of color by forcing them into a category that fails to
fully recognize the scope of their claims. 21
Contrary to the holding of several courts, women of color
may experience a unique form of discrimination. As Kimberle
Crenshaw explains, Black women22 experience an "intersec-

WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN
AMERICA, 54 (1984).
Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority in Sharon v. Richardson,
16.
411 U.S. 677 (1973), speaks of the historic discrimination of women and Blacks. In
describing the historic oppression of both he never speaks of the Black woman. In
explaining why gender should be a suspect classification under the Equal Protection analysis, Brennan states, "And although blacks were guaranteed the right to
vote in 1870, women were denied even that right [ . . . 1 until the adoption of the
19th Amendment half a century later." Id. at 685.
17.
Soujouner Truth's speech criticized the reasons given by White men
for disenfranchisement of women. Men stating the women should not be involved
in the political process since they were too frail and delicate. Truth spoke about
how she had worked hard in the fields as a slave woman, been lashed by a whip
and seen her children sold into slavery. BELL HOOKS, supra note 15 at 160.
BELL HOOKS, supra note 15 at 159-160.
18.
BELL HOOKS, supra note 15 at 159.
19.
20.
Peggie Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII,
14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 33 (1991).
21.
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 152; ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL
WOMAN 114-115 (1988). Spelman states that the racial identity of a women is presumed to be White when it is not stated and Black women are only included
when there is an explicit reference to Black women. The term Blacks is also largely considered to mean Black men. Id. at 114.
22.
While I focus on employment discrimination cases of Black women
more than other women of color, it is because there are a limited number of cases
discussing the claims of other women of color. Thus, the analysis which is used
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tion" of discrimination. 23 First, they may experience racism or
sexism exclusive of each other.24 Second, they may experience
a combination of these characteristics such as an employment
policy which is discriminatory to both Blacks and women (double discrimination).25 Third, they may experience discrimination as the single entity of a Black woman, based on stereotype
different from those shared by White women or Black men26
(interactive discrimination).27
This comment will focus on how a single characteristic
construction of Title VII has distorted and marginalized the
claims of women of color. Part One illustrates how the courts
initially refused to recognize the claim of interactive discrimination. Part Two explains the limited way in which courts
began to recognize the interactive claims brought by women of
color. Instead of seeing the plaintiffs as alleging the single
entity of interactive discrimination, courts have bisected the
claim into "sex plus race.,,28 Par Three focuses on the issue of
women of color as adequately representing a class in a class
action suit. Since a Black women may experience discrimination in several ways, the courts have grappled with both the
scope of her claim and who she may represent. Part Four analyzes the recent Ninth Circuit case of Lam v. University of
Hawaii 29 and sets forth a proposed framework for analyzing
discrimination claims brought by women of color.
II.

REFUSING THE CLAIM OF INTERACTIVE
DISCRIMINATION

The leading case where a federal court considered and
rejected a claim of interactive discrimination under Title VII is

for Black women would apply to cases for all women of color.
23.
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 149.
24.
See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-1093 (9th Cir. 1975).
25.
Donaldson v. Pillsbury, 554 F.2d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 1977).
26.
Lam, 40 F.3d 1551 at 1562.
27.
Smith, supra note 20 at 23. See also, Elizabeth W. Shoben, Compound
Discrimination: The interaction of Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55
N.Y.U L. REV. 973, 796. Shoben uses the term compound discrimination rather
than interactive discrimination.
28.
Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034.
29.
40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
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DeGraffenreid v. General Motors. 30 In DeGraffenreid, five
Black women claimed General Motors' ("GM") seniority system
of "last hired first fired" had a disparate impact upon Black
women. 31 GM did not hire Black women prior to 1964, and all
of the Black women who were hired lost their jobs during a
recession due to GM's lay-off policy.32 The District Court
granted partial summary judgment for the defendant, holding
that the plaintiffs could sue on the basis of race or on the basis
of sex, but they were not allowed to combine the claims. 33 In
rejecting the claim of interactive discrimination, the District
Court stated that the plaintiffs were combining two causes of
action, race and gender, which effectively created a special
subclass. 34 The court viewed the claim as beyond the scope of
Title VII and forced the plaintiffs to chose between claiming
race discrimination or gender discrimination. 35
... they should not be allowed to combine statutory remedies to create a new 'super-remedy'
which would give them relief beyond what the
drafters of relevant statutes intended. 36

The claims were then broken into two individual causes of
action: race discrimination and sex discrimination. 37 The sex
discrimination claim was dismissed since the women had been
hired prior to the enactment of Title VII. 38 The plaintiffs
claim of race discrimination was consolidated with another suit
brought by Black men alleging GM engaged in race discrimination. 39 Although the plaintiffs asserted in oral argument that
30.
413 F. Supp. 142 (E. D. Mo. 1976)
31.
[d. at 143. A prima facie case of disparate impact is set out in Griggs
v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The plaintiff must show that while the
employers policy is neutral on the face, it has a discriminatory impact on the protected class of persons. The employer can then rebut the presumption of discrimination by proving the existence of a business necessity. [d. at 431. Disparate impact is defined at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1993).
32.
[d. at 144.
33.
[d. at 145.
34.
DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143.
35.
[d.
36.
[d.
37.
[d.
38.
[d. at 144.
39.
DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. See Moseley v. General Motors,
497 F. Supp. 583 (E. D. Mo. 1980). The plaintiffs in Moseley alleged a broad claim
of race discrimination. The seniority system challenged in DeGraffenreid was not
considered in the case. Yet, while the women were given a monetary award, back
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the consolidation would not adequately represent their interactive discrimination claim, the court ordered the consolidation. 40 The court stated that if it recognized the plaintiffs
claim of both race and sex discrimination, it would create a
special subclass beyond the scope of Title VII. 41 To permit the
plaintiffs' claim would open the door to allowing discrimination
claims based on any combination of factors, which would lead
to "the prospect of opening a hackneyed Pandora's box. "42
In denying the plaintiffs claims, the court established a
structure for analyzing interactive claims using a ''but-for"
theory."3 The plaintiffs could only bring a cause of action if
they alleged that but-for one factor they would have been
treated the same as White men!4 Thus, a claim alleging butfor race or but-for sex was recognized, while a claim alleging a
combination of both was seen as beyond the scope of Title
VII. 45
The Black women in DeGraffenreid, were required to show
that the discrimination they experienced was similar to that of
Black men or White women."6 A woman of color who is forced
to separate her claims into race or sex discrimination will have
Black men included in her statistics of race discrimination and
White women included her claim of sex discrimination."7
While these statistics will show the effect of either race and

seniority was not awarded. Id.
40.
DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145.
41.
Id. at 145
42.
Id.
43.
Crenshaw, Intersectionality, supra note 7 at 151. Crenshaw explains
the theory by analogizing to a room filled with people who are disadvantaged
stacked on top of each other, with those who are the most disadvantaged at the
bottom. The people at the top are brushing up against what is the floor for people
who are not disadvantaged. In order to be able to climb through the hatch in the
floor to the other room with those who are not disadvantaged, a person must
claim that "but for" one characteristic they would have been treated the same as
the others.
44.
Id. at 152.
45.
DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. Since the Black women were
denied the claim of interactive discrimination, the court considered all women for
gender discrimination claim. Id.
46.
Id. at 143, Smith, supra note 20 at 33.
47.
DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143.
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sex discrimination, these statistics will not be evidence of interactive discrimination. 48
While such a standard is inadequate,49 the District Court
in DeGraffenreid concluded that the existence of interactive
discrimination granted too much protection to women of color
under Title VII, and denied the plaintiffs the right to bring
such a claim. 50 Although a minority of jurisdictions follow the
analysis of DeGraffenreid, 51 the following cases demonstrate
how the courts tend to return to this analysis.
III. RECOGNIZING THE
DISCRIMINATION

CLAIM OF INTERACTIVE

In Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n,52 the Fifth
Circuit first recognized the combined claims of both race and
sex discrimination. A Black woman brought an individual
disparate treatment53 action against Harris Community Action Association, alleging sex discrimination, race discrimination and interactive discrimination. 54 Jefferies was employed

48.
See, e.g., Crenshaw, Intersectionality, supra note 7 at 152. Crenshaw
notes that forcing a Black woman into alleging sex and race separately
marginalizes there experiences and fails to address the plaintiffs real cause of
action. Id.
49.
Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562, fn. 19 (1994).
50.
DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. The court feared plaintiffs would
claim discrimination based on many or all of the characteristics stated in Title
VII, and there would be no way to contain the scope of Title VII. Id
51.
Since DeGraffenreid, other cases such as Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D Neb. 1986) and Graham v. Benedix Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1036 (N.D. Ind. 1984) have recognized the claim of interactive discrimination.
52.
615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
53.
The prima facie case for a disparate treatment case is set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff has the
burden of showing that the job was open, she applied and was qualified for the
job, despite her qualifications she was rejected and the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants. [d. at 802.
The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason why the plaintiff was not hired. The plaintiff, retaining the
ultimate burden of persuasion, can argue that the reason given by the employer is
pretext. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-254
(1981).
54.
The plaintiffs original claim included age discrimination but it is not
discussed as part of her claim in this opinion. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1030. See,
also, Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n, 425 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex.
1977).
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as a secretary and had been denied several promotions within
the company.55 When two new promotions were posted, she
applied for both but was denied the promotions. A Black man
and a White woman were promoted instead of the plaintiff. 56
The District court found in favor of the defendant57 and held
that since a Black man and a White woman had been promoted the plaintiff had failed to prove her prima facie case. 58 The
Fifth Circuit applied the "sex-plus" analysis established in
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,59 which split the plaintiff's
claim into gender discrimination plus discrimination based on
a neutral factor60 and applied this theory to Jefferies claim of
interactive discrimination. 61
The Jefferies court recognized that employers are not allowed to discriminate against women with children or married
women since that is a form of unlawful discrimination based
on sex plus the neutral factor of having children or being married. 62 If employers are prohibited from discriminating on this
basis, it would be illogical to allow discrimination against the
subclass of Black women,63 since race and gender are two protected classes under Title VII. 64 Thus, the court held that
when a Black woman claimed interactive discrimination, "the
fact that black males or white females are not subject to the
discrimination is irrelevant."65
The plaintiffs were allowed to claim race discrimination,

55.
Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1029.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 1030-1031.
58.
Id. at 1031. See note 53, supra, discussing the prima facie case.
59.
411 F.2d. 1-4, affd, in Philips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971). Based on a company policy which forbade the hiring of women with preschool age children, the plaintiffs brought a systematic disparate treatment claim.
The court held this was sex discrimination plus the neutral characteristic of having a preschool age child. Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Jefferies, 615 F. Supp. at 1034.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 1034. The court also refuted the finding in DeGraffenreid that
the plaintiffs claim was beyond the type of protection which Congress had intended since Congress had denied amending the act to include the word "solely." Id. at
1032.
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sex discrimination and interactive discrimination. 66 In analyzing these claims the Fifth Circuit found no evidence of race
discrimination but remanded the claim of sex discrimination
for further findings. 67 After recognizing the claim of interactive discrimination the court also remanded this claim. 68
The court in Jefferies employed several analytical devices
for interactive discrimination claims. First, it allowed women
of color to seek remedy for interactive discrimination. 69 It also
recognized the claim of interactive discrimination as a separate
cause of action with its own evidence, distinct from a race or
sex claim. 70 Even in the absence of race discrimination, a
women of color may still have a claim for interactive discrimination. 71 Because of this a Black woman, in a disparate treatment case, may proffer evidence showing that both Black men
and Black women were discriminated against to support her
claim of race discrimination. 72 She can also proffer evidence of
discrimination solely against Black women to prove interactive
discrimination. 73
Not all aspects of the Jefferies decision were an advance
for women claiming interactive discrimination. The court
phrased the claim within a sex-plus analysis. 74 In essence, the
court stated that but-for sex and an added characteristic, the
plaintiff would have been treated the same as a White man. 75
This continues to characterize Black women as a compound of
two separate parts instead of as the single entity of "Black
women." The court should not use the analysis of sex-plus for a

Id at 1034-1035.
Id. at 1032.
68.
Id. at 1035.
69.
Id. at 1034.
70.
Id.
71.
Judith Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981,
and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 775 at 800. Winston concludes the significance of the court not finding
race discrimination but remanding the claim of interactive discrimination infers
that the independent findings of race and gender discrimination may bolster each
other so that the sum is greater than the parts. Id. at 80l.
72.
Jefferies, 615 F. Supp. at 1033.
73.
Id.
Id at 1033. Shoben, supra note 27, at page 804 criticizes the use of
74.
the sex-plus analysis as only addressing the issue of sex discrimination.
75.
Id.
66.
67.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 6

422

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:413

Black woman's claim, but instead should limit it to claims in
which the "plus" is an immutable characteristic. 76 By using
the sex-plus analysis, the court infers that the race of Black
women is a secondary characteristic, to be analyzed in addition
to the sex discrimination claim. 77 Thus, the door is left open
for lower courts to tally how many factors a person is removed
from the "norm" (Le. White male) and then decide if the claim
is one which the court will recognize. 78
Such an analysis dictated the court's decision in Judge v.
Marsh. 79 The plaintiff was a Black woman employed by the
United States Army.80 The Army had a small panel which
rated and referred all employees for promotion. 81 The plaintiff
claimed that the panel inaccurately summarized her qualifications and failed to recommend her because she was a Black
woman. 82 She alleged a claim of disparate treatment based on
interactive discrimination due to the defendant's failure to
select her for promotions and to assign her higher promotion
.
ratings. 53
Using the sex-plus analysis from Jefferies, the District
Court held that plaintiff could only allege one "plus."B4 If the
plaintiff was allowed allege more than one protected characteristic, there would be protected sub-groups for every combination of characteristics protected under Title VII. 85 The court
illustrated this problem by using the analogy of a many headed
Hydra. 86 Taken to the extreme, the Jefferies rationale would

76.
riences, 98
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Cathy Scarborough, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment ExpeYALE L. J. 1457, 1472 (1989).
Smith, supra note 20 at 44, Shoben, supra note 27 at 804.
Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1471.
649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 773
82.
Id. at 775.
83.
Id.
84.
Judge, 649 F. Supp. at 780.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. In both DeGraffenreid and Judge, the courts analogize the Black
women's claims to mythological female monsters. Hydra was a multi-headed water
serpent who grew two heads for every one which was cut oft'. Hydra was killed by
Hercules who burned oft' the heads. Pandora was created by Zeus to plague mankind. Zeus gave her a box containing diseases and trouble which she opened and
let the evils escape leaving only hope left in the box. GroUer Electronic Publishing
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allow for protected sub-groups which combine all of the characteristics protected under Title VIL s7 The court stated that the
Jefferies analysis is Umited to "one protected, immutable trait
or fundamental right, which are directed against individuals
sharing a second protected, immutable characteristic."ss By
narrowing the scope of Title VII the court stated that Title VII
will "not be splintered beyond the use of recognition."s9
The District Court in Judge made it clear that a woman of
color can only deviate so far from the norm of a White male
before the claim is viewed as too obscure,9o because her claim
consists of too many factors removed from the "norm" to be
recognized. 91 For example, a Black woman alleging discrimination based on the interaction of race, sex and age 92 would
have to choose only two factors, even though this would inadequately address her claim. 93 While she may experience discrimination based on each factor separately (because she is
Black, a woman or older) this does not preclude the fact that
she was discriminated against based on the stereo-type which
derived from the claim being seen as one entity (an older Black
woman).94
The conflict between splitting apart a plaintiff's claim into
multiple factors and looking at it as a single entity does not
always occur when a plaintiff brings a claim of interactive
discrimination. 95 For example, the federal courts do not sepa-

Co.(1983).
Judge, 649 F. Supp. 770, at 780.
87.
88.
[d.
89.
[d.
90.
Not all courts have followed this analysis. For example, in Chambers
v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), the court allowed the
plaintiff to allege that she was discriminated against on the basis of being an
unmarried pregnant Black woman. [d. at 947.
91.
Judge, 649 F. Supp. at 780. The court did allow the plaintiff to claim
interactive discrimination, but it was dismissed for failure to meet the ultimate
burden of persuasion. [d. at 781.
This was the original claim brought by the plaintiff in Jefferies v.
92.
Harris Community Action Ass'n , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) at 1029.
Smith, supra note 20 at 46.
93.
In Chambers, 629 F. Supp. 925 at 944, the plaintiff claimed she was
94.
discriminated against based on the stereo-type of being an unmarried, pregnant,
Black woman.
95.
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 142.
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rate the claims of a White woman into White and woman. 96 A
White woman's claim is not seen as creating a "many-headed
Hydra" as referred to in Judge, since courts only sees her as
claiming that ''but-for'' her gender she would not have been
discriminated against. She is not required to claim her race as
a part of her discrimination claim, since Whiteness is seen as a
race neutral characteristic. 97
A similar analysis can be drawn with a discrimination
claim brought by a White man. For example in Wilson v.
Bailey,98 two White men who were deputy sheriffs brought a
disparate treatment action alleging "reverse discrimination"
due to the City's voluntary affirmative action plan. 99 They
alleged that, "minorities and women were promoted," rather
than White men. 100 In analyzing this claim, the court did not
separate the claim into race and gender with statistics of Black
men included in the claim for gender discrimination and White
women included in the statistics of race discrimination. 101
There was no debate at all about the plaintiffs ability to allege
an interactive claim, and the court merely viewed the plaintiffs
as claiming the single entity of ''White men" as the basis of
discrimination. 102
The federal courts do not look to Wilson as a precedent for
interactive discrimination in Title VII cases since these courts
do not see the White men as alleging a claim of interactive
discrimination. 103 Since courts often proceed as if White men
are considered the norm,I04 their claim will not be viewed as

96.
Price Water House v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price the
plaintiff claimed gender discrimination. The plaintiff did not have to specify her
race since it is assumed with a White woman that race is not an issue but only
gender. [d. at 236. Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1468.
97.
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 145.
98.
934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991).
99.
[d. at 304.
100.
[d.
[d.
101.
102.
[d. See also, Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 940 F.2d 1394 (4th Cir.
1991), Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1991).
103.
[d., Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 142 ft. note 12, states that no case
has been discovered in which white men were not allowed to bring a reverse discrimination claim due because the claim alleged discrimination based on the interaction of race and gender.
104.
Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1476.
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obscure or alleging too many factors that remove them from
the norm. 105 The problem of obscuring claim only occurs
when a plaintiff alleges different characteristics other than just
race or sex. 106 Despite the cases which have allowed reverse
discrimination,107 lower courts have only sporadically allowed
woman of color to allege an interactive claim, while always
allowing them to allege discrimination on the basis of race and
gender as separate factors to be proved independently. lOS
IV.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION IN CLASS ACTIONS

Struggling with the complex manner in which women of
color can experience discrimination, the courts have been unable to formulate a standard analysis to determine when a
woman of color can adequately represent a class. As evidenced
from Jefferies and Judge 109 women of color may claim discrimination based on race, sex, a combination of both, or interactive discrimination. 110 When a woman is alleging bothlll
interactive discrimination and sex discrimination, she cannot
represent a class of women who allege sex discrimination. l12
Often the federal courts will view her claims as placing her at
odds with the White women. 113 Courts will only allow for a

Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 154-155; Scarborough, supra note 76 at
105.
1476.
[d.
106.
107.
Wilson, 934 F.2d at 304. See also, Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va.,
940 F.2d 1394 (4th Cir. 1991), Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d
1394 (11th Cir. 1991).
108.
See, Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994), Parker v. Secretary, H.U.D, 891 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1989), Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n 615 F.2d 412, Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986),
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp 925 (D. Neb. 1986), Graham v.
Benedix Corp., 585 F. Supp 1036 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
109.
Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n., 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.
1980); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
110.
See notes 34 to 45 for a discussion on Jefferies and notes 79-84 for a
discussion of Judge.
111.
Donaldson v. Pillsbury, 554 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1977). In Donaldson,
the plaintiffs alleged that the employer had a policy which had an adverse impact
on Blacks and women. [d. at 829.
112.
Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 482-484 (9th Cir.
1983).
113.
[d. at 479-480.
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woman of color to represent a class if she stays within the
strict limits of a but-for theory.u4
In Moore u. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., U5 Black women
brought a class action alleging both sex discrimination and
race discrimination in the employer's promotion practices. u6
The plaintiffs claimed the company's promotion policy had a
disparate impact on both Blacks and women. U7 For the sex
discrimination claim, Moore petitioned the court to represent a
broader class which included all females. us The Ninth Circuit
confirmed the lower court's holding and refused to certify
Moore as the class representative, since the class included both
Black women and White women. 119
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Moore had not claimed
"she was discriminated against as a female but only as a Black
female."120 The court forced Moore into a narrower claim of
interactive discrimination even though she alleged disparate
impact on the basis of race and sex. 121 Moore was only allowed to use evidence that "Black women" were discriminated
againse 22 rather than being able to show that Black women
would be affected by any policy which had a disparate impact
against Blacks and/or women. 123 Without the use of both sets
of statistics, Moore was unable to make out her prima facie
case for discrimination. 124
In order for Moore to represent the class of women, even
in a disparate impact case, she was required to allege sex discrimination claims separately. 125 Once Moore claimed discrimination as a "Black women" she narrowed the scope of her

114.

[d.

115.

708 F.2d 475, 483 (9th Cir. 1983).
[d. at 478.
[d. at 483.
[d. at 479.
[d. at 480.
Moore, 708 F.2d at 480.
[d.
[d. at 482-484.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

[d.
[d. at 485, Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 146.

Moore, 708 F.2d at 480.
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claim and placed herself at odds with White women. 126 The
Ninth Circuit viewed the interactive claim as alleging she was
discriminated against in favor of both Black men and White
women, and thus she is unable to adequately represent the
class of women. 127
It is inconsistent to argue, in a disparate impact case, that
once Moore claimed interactive discrimination she would be
precluded from claiming discrimination on the basis of her
gender or race. 128 Since Moore is Black, she would be adversely affected by any policy which discriminates on the basis
of race. In addition, since she is a woman, she will be adversely effected by any policy which discriminates on the basis of
gender. The complex nature in which women of color experience discrimination has led the courts to view her as having
"greater standing" in the law, seen in both DeGraffenreid and
Judge. 129 Ironically, women of color, as evidenced from the
prior cases, have a greater need to claim interactive discrimination, and yet the courts restrict the scope of their claims. 130
Women of color are forced to bring their claims within the butfor analysis, allowing them to allege only part of their
claim. 131 Forcing the claim into such a narrow analysis only
allows for small changes within the field of employment
law. 132

To avoid restricting the plaintiffs ability to represent a
class, as seen in Moore, a plaintiff can bring class actions alleging race discrimination and sex discrimination separately, but
cannot claim interactive discrimination if she hopes to be
viewed as adequately representing the class. 133 For example,
in Donaldson v. Pillsbury134 the plaintiff, a Black woman,

126.
Crenshaw, supra at note 7, at 144-146.
127.
Moore, 708 F.2d at 480.
128.
See, Crenshaw supra note 7, at 144. Once Moore specified her race,
the court narrowed her claim and saw her as placing herself at odds with White
women.ld.
129.
DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. at 143 and Judge, 649
F. Supp. at 780.
130.
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 145.
Id.
131.
132.
Id.
133.
554 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1977).
134.
Id.
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brought a claim of disparate impact alleging discrimination
against Black and women employees who had been denied
employment or promotion on the basis of race or sex. 135 Reversing the District court's finding that the plaintiffs did not
meet the "typicality" requirement for class actions, the Eighth
Circuit stated, "the defendant's practices had the effect of limiting job opportunities of women and blacks."136
The plaintiff was able to certify her suit since she alleged
discrimination based on a combination of two separate factors.137 Thus, the court included statistics of Black men for
her race discrimination claim and White women for her sex
discrimination claim. 13B Having alleged race discrimination
and sex discrimination separately, the federal courts will not
force the women into an interactive claim and thus perceived
them as being at odds with the other plaintiffs. 139 As long as
the plaintiff remains within the but-for analysis she will be
seen as adequately representing the claims of the class. l40 Alternatively, even when a plaintiff stays within a strict but-for
analysis only alleging sex and/or race discrimination, the
courts may still restrict the scope of a Black woman's claim
when there is not only a disparity between the Black employees and the White employees or all male employees and female
employees, but also where there is a disparity between the
Black men and the Black women. 141
In Payne v. Travenol,142 two Black women brought a
class action suit alleging race discrimination on behalf of all
the Black employees and later amended the complaint to include sex discrimination. l43 No Blacks were employed by
Travenol prior to 1965. 144 When Blacks were hired, the plain-

135.
Id. at 829.
136.
Id. at 832. The statistics proffered by the plaintiff was separated into
Black solely and sex solely. There was no evidence proffered regarding the status
of Black women. Id. at 830. See FED R. CIV. P. 23(a).
137.
Donaldson, 554 F.2d at 832.
138.
Id. at 830.
139.
Id. at 83l.
140.
Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 145, c.r, Moore, 708 F.2d 480.
141.
Payne v. Travenol, 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982).
142.
Id.
143.
Id. at 805.
144.
Id.
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tiffs claimed Travenol's employment policy had a disparate
impact on Blacks since Travenol required a 10th grade education for the assembly line jobs and twelfth grade or college
education requirement to be employed as a clerk or technician. l45 At the request of the defendant, the court restricted
the scope of the plaintiffs' claim to only include Black women. l46 Although the plaintiffs were claiming a disparity between Black and White employees,147 the court narrowed the
scope of the claim since there was a disparity between the
Black men and the Black women. 146
The females, therefore sought to establish that
the males were favored at their expense. This
claim plainly draws at the interests of the males
into contrast with the interests of the females. 149

Yet, the plaintiffs were not claiming interactive discrimination but discrimination based on race and sex separately
(double discrimination).15o They were not placing themselves
at odds with the Black men by stating that the Black men
were treated more favorably than the Black women. The plaintiffs were alleging they had been adversely affected by both
discriminatory practices. 151 While the plaintiffs were able to
use the over-all statistics of race discrimination, after they prevailed the Black men were unable to share in the remedy.152
This not only demonstrates how a but-for analysis restricts the
scope of Black women's claims, but also shows how the Fifth
Circuit viewed a conflict along both race and gender lines. 153
Since Payne alleged sex discrimination, the court viewed her
as placing herself at odds with the Black men,154 despite the

145.
[d.
Payne, 673 F.2d at 807.
146.
147.
[d. at 809.
148.
[d.
149.
[d. at 810.
150.
[d. at 809.
Payne, 673 F.2d at 809.
151.
152.
[d. at 812.
153.
The court forced the plaintiffs to chose between discrimination based
on race to represent the Black men or chose to claim discrimination based on
gender which disallows the plaintiffs to represent the Black men. [d. at 811,
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 148.
154.
Payne, 673 F.2d at 810.
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fact that she included a claim of race discrimination in which
the Black men are similarly situated to Payne. 155
In contrast to Payne, Tennie v. City of New York Dep't of
Soc. Serv. 156 allowed Black women to represent the claims of
all minority women although the plaintiffs were not all of the
same race. 157 Six Black women and one Hispanic woman
brought a class action based on a claim of interactive discrimination in which the class included both Black women and
Hispanic women. 158 The plaintiffs were previously employed
as children's counselor's in various Department of Social Services (DSS) institutions but were transferred to other DSS
departments when the City closed several of the offices. 159
When the plaintiffs were transferred their salary declined,
which they claimed was due to their race and gender. 160
Since all the females alleged discrimination based on the status of minority women, they were able to be certified as a
class. 161 The District Court viewed the claims as alleging that
all of the plaintiffs were discriminated against in favor of
White males due to their race and gender. 162 "Thus, both
blacks and Hispanics are alleging that they have been discriminated against in precisely the same manner.,,163
The District Court placed the claim into the analysis of
but-for one characteristic, (being a women of color) the plaintiffs would not have been adversely affected by the employer's
policy.l64 Unlike the court in Payne, the court in Tennie did
not view the minority women as being in conflict with each
other.165 Even though a Hispanic woman may be discriminat155.
[d. at 810-811.
156.
1987 WL 6156 (S.D. N.Y. 1987).
157.
[d. at *2.
158.
The class originated as all employees who worked as counselors in
New York city prior to 1977 and now work in other divisions. The class therefore
included persons of both sexes and including Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. [d. at
*3.
159.
[d. at *2
160.
[d.
161.
Tennie, 1987 WL 6156 at *3.
162.
[d.
163.
[d.
164.
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 151, explains the but-for analysis used by
the courts.
165.
Tennie, 1987 WL 6156 at *3.
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ed against based on a different stereotype than a Black woman, they were both claiming that all men and all White employees were treated more favorably, and because of this the
Black women were able to represent the claims of Hispanic
women. 166
In comparing both Payne and Tennie, it is clear that the
plaintiffs are not analyzed by their own experiences of discrimination but how they are treated in comparison to White
men. 167 While this may be helpful in proving the discriminatory practice, the initial focus of the claim should be on what
the plaintiffs are claiming as the basis of the discrimination
and who else has been adversely affected by this discriminatory act or policy.16s Not only do the courts prematurely view a
conflict between the plaintiffs when defining the scope of the
claim but the courts will also restrict what the plaintiffs may
claim as the basis of the discrimination, as seen in Moore and
DeGraffenreid. 169

v.

A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Mer examining the various ways in which the federal
courts have analyzed the claims of women of color, this comment proposes that for an individual disparate treatment case,
the courts draw from parts of the analysis in Lam v. University
of Hawaii 170 and expanded upon in Good v. U.S. West Communications. l7l For a claim of disparate impact, courts should
draw from Lam to set up a framework for the analysis, but
should also consider the problems that may arise in class actions as seen in Moore 172 and Payne. 173

166.
[d.
[d. at *3.
167.
168.
See, Castro and Corral, Women of Color and Employment Discrimination: Race and Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 La Raza L.J. 159. This
articles focuses an the need to focus on the individual's claim rather than separating the plaintiffs claim into single factors.
169.
DeGraffenreid 413 F. Supp at 143 and Moore, 708 F. Supp. at 480.
170.
40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
171.
1995 WL 67672 *1 (D. Or. 1995).
172.
See discussion of Moore, supra notes 114-13l.
173.
See discussion of Payne, supra notes 140-153.
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In Lam, an Asian woman brought a claim of individual
disparate treatment in the University's hiring practices. 174 A
small committee was appointed to recommend a person for the
position of Director of the Pacific Asian Legal Studies. 175 Persons less qualified than Lam were considered for the job and
one of the committee members evaluating Lam stated there
should not be another woman teaching commercial law. 176
The Dean recognized that this member had difficulty dealing
. with women. 177 The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants since the committee had favorably
considered an Asian man and a White woman. 178 Following
the analysis in DeGraffenreid, the District Court separated her
claim into race and gender separately, and did not allow her to
state a claim for interactive discrimination. 179 In reversing
the District Court, the Ninth Circuit relied on Jefferies and the
works of both Kimberle Crenshaw and Judith Winston. 180
Rather than aiding the decisional process, the
attempt to bisect identity at the intersection of
race and gender often distorts or ignores the
particular nature of their experiences ... Asian
women are subject to a set of stereo-types and
assumptions that are neither shared by Asian
men nor white women ... when a plaintiff is
claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to
determine whether the employer discriminates
on the basis of that combination of factors, not
just whether it discriminates against the people
of the same race or of the same sex. 181

The Lam decision establishes several useful tools for analyzing interactive discrimination cases. First, the court focused
more on the plaintiffs individual basis of discrimination as
opposed to splitting apart her claim. 182 The Ninth Circuit not
only recognized the claim of interactive discrimination but also

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Lam, 40 F.3d at 1558.
Id. at 1552.
Id. at 1557.
Id. at 1564.
Id.
Lam, 40 F.3d at 156l.
Id. at 1562.
Id.
Id.
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stated that the District court was incorrect in separating Lam's
claim. 183 The District Court had reduced the claim into Asian
men plus White women, which had distorted Lam's claim. 1M
Lam alleged discrimination based in being on Asian woman
and not solely as an Asian or as a woman. 185 The Ninth Circuit identified the inherent fallacy of splitting the claim by
analogizing to the bisection of a White man's claim using statistics of Asian men in his claim for gender discrimination and
statistics of White women in his claim for race discrimination.186
Second, the court recognized that the Asian women are
subject to stereo-types that are not shared by either Asian men
or White women, showing a clear need for courts to recognize
the claims of intersectionality.187 Third, the court recognized
the complexity of a woman of color's claim stating that a court
cannot" ... bisect a person's identity at the intersection of
race and gender ... ,,188 Still, the court also acknowledged
that a woman of color may be subjected to single factor discrimination such as solely race or solely sex. 189
While the Ninth Circuit's analysis advances the ability of
women of color to bring an interactive claim, the court falls
into several of the same problem areas as earlier decisions.
First, the decision speaks of Lam's claim of interactive discrimination as a combination of two factors instead of as the single
unity of an Asian woman. 190 While the Ninth Circuit did not
analyze the claim as a combination of factors, the language
used by the Ninth Circuit may cause other federal courts to
fall back into the sex-plus analysis that was used in Judge,
which considered the number of factors a person is removed
from the norm as the basis of discrimination. 191 Further, the
183.
Id.
184.
Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
The court refers to J. Hagedorn, Asian Women in Film: No joy, No
Luck, MS. Jan./Feb., 1994 at 74, which illustrates some of the stereotypes which
Asian women are subjected to such as geisha, dragon lady and concubine. Id.
188.
Lam, 40 F.3d 1582.
189.
Id. at 1561-62.
190.
Id.
191.
Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986).
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court speaks of Asian women as a separate subgroup protected
under Title VII. 192 This may result in revisiting the class action problems of Payne,193 where the Black women were seen
as a subgroup and thus unable to represent all Black employees for the claim of race discrimination. 194
Utilizing the theory set forth in Lam, the District Court in
Good v. U.S. West Communications ,195 expanded the theory of
interactive discrimination beyond Title VII to include age discrimination protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").196 The plaintiff claimed she was discriminated against based on the interactive claim of age and sex
discrimination since she was replaced by a younger male. 197
The District court initially granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the age discrimination claim. 198 Good then
moved the District Court to reinstate her claim of age discrimination since she claimed discrimination based on being an
older woman, rather than alleging age and sex separately.199
Focusing on the Good's original claim of discrimination, the
court cited Lam 200 and stated that the theory of interactive
discrimination applies to the ADEA and not just Title VII
claims.201
VI. CONCLUSION
Good focused on the need to allow the plaintiff to individually state what she believes is the basis for the discrimination. 202 Both Lam and Good should be allowed to state what

192.
Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562.
193.
Payne, 673 F.2d at 810.
194.
Id.
195.
1995 WL 67672 *1 (D. Or. 1995).
196.
Id.
197.
Id. at *1. Sex discrimination is protected under Title VII and age discrimination is protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
See 29 U.S.C.A. 623.
198.
Id.
199.
Id.
200.
Good, 1995 WL 67672 at *1.
201.
Id.
202.
Id. at 1561, fn. 16, the court noted that Lam also alleged National
Origin discrimination since the Asian man who was considered for her position
was Chinese and Lam is Vietnamese-French. Id.
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type of discrimination they have been subjected to and not
have a court determine what the basis of the claim should
be. 203 For example, if a Chicana woman brings a claim for
interactive discrimination in a disparate treatment case, the
law should not perceive the claim as a combination of race,
color, sex and national origin but as the single entity in which
she has experienced the discrimination, a Chicana woman. 204
Just as plaintiffs in most other fields of law can determine
which claims they are to bring forth in a lawsuit, so should a
woman of color in a Title VII action. 205
This same focus on the individual's experience of discrimination in a disparate treatment case should be applicable to
disparate impact cases. If a woman of color is alleging discrimination based on race, she should be able to represent the class
of persons who also allege race discrimination. 206 The fact
that she may also bring a claim of sex discrimination or interactive discrimination should not bar her from representing the
class for a claim of race discrimination. 207 Just because she
may have been subjected to other forms of discrimination, does
not mean that she has not been subjected to race discrimination, and is not typical of the class. 208 She should still be able
to both represent the class for a race discrimination suit and
be a member of the other classes. 209
Instead of trying to compare separate claims of race or sex
discrimination by looking at how these claims separate the
plaintiff from the norm, each claim needs to be looked on its
individual merits. 210 The preliminary focus should be on how
the plaintiff has experienced the discrimination and not what
the courts believe the plaintiff should allege as the basis for

203.
Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562, Good 1995 WL 67672 at *1.
204.
Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1476, explains protected groups of people have distinct histories and their claims should be understood based on their
own experiences.
205.
Id.
206.
See supra notes 114 to 131 for a discussion of Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983).
207.
Id.
208.
See supra notes 140 to 153 for a discussion of Payne v. Travenol, 673
F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982).
209.
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 144-148.
210.
Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1476.
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discrimination. Courts need to allow a woman of color to claim
interactive discrimination, but not force her into a class of
interactive discrimination if she is only alleging race or gender
discrimination. 211
While focusing on the individual may not solve all problems with intersectionality claims, it will create an awareness
in the judicial system of how a person may be subjected to
discrimination in a wide variety of forms. Allowing the plaintiff
to individually determine the basis for a claim of discrimination and represent all people who have been subjected to the
same type of discrimination, the court will allow for a broader
reform in current structure of both employment law and employment practices.

Mary Elizabeth Powell'

211.

See supra notes 114 to 131 for a discussion of Moore.
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